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This thesis has a basic hypothesis that previous failures
of information systems in organizations are directly related
to the disproportionately high amount of emphasis given to
the technical aspects of data processing as compared to the
inadequate attention and concern devoted by management,
computer specialists, and users of information systems to
critical behavioral issues. The behavioral issues presented
are subunit conflicts, training, skills, and perceptions of
the participants, information sharing, power, and organiza-
tional politics. After reviewing the underlying reasons be-
hind the lack of success achieved in the past, the organiza-
tional impact of fourth generation distributive processing
techniques is predicted. A conflict and power model is pre-
sented that addresses the key organizational variables that
prohibit successful information systems 1 design and develop-
ment. Recommendations regarding operation, design, and
organizational activities are presented with the goal of im-
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Large-scale computing systems have revolutionized the
management of most means by which goods and services are
produced , or information is accumulated. Such systems
interact with organizational, historical, and political
pressures to shape the internal structure of industrial,
governmental and other organizations. They also shape the
way in which organizations interact with individuals.
During active proliferation of new and revised manage-
ment procedures, designers of information systems cannot
help being organizational designers as well. They cannot
avoid changing organizations. But which way will the
changes go? It has been pointed out long ago that intelli-
gent understanding of a machine mode of control may be de-
layed until long after this control has been exercised
[Weiner, 1954]. Thus, there exists widespread concern about
the ultimate effect of information systems on the quality
of life of their end users.
Current research has indicated that users do not under-
stand much of the output they receive, there is duplication
of input and output, and changes are frequently made in sys-
tems without consulting users. Because of inaccuracies,
users often discount all of the information provided by a
system. Many users complain of information overload;
massive amounts of data are provided which cannot be digested
by the decisionmaker. There are also many complaints about

the difficulty of obtaining changes in existing systems.
A number of users report that they do not actually use the
information provided by an information system [Lucas, 1975].
Many feel that computer-based information systems are not
worth the time or cost to develop, and that the organization
would be better off without them.
One major design problem which has been often overlooked
is how information is used by a decisionmaker. Systems have
been designed to provide data without considering the types
of use of the information. As the information systems tech-
nology continues to mature, more sophisticated systems will
be designed and implemented and the need for understanding
the uses of information and the resultant impact on organi-
zational behavioral patterns will become more critical.
In addition to understanding user needs and the use of
information, there are three major problem areas in systems
design and implementation. The first is technical and in-
cludes designing a system, writing programs, testing the
systems, and converting the old files and procedures into a
new system. The second problem category is organizational:
new work relationships are established, changes are made in
job content, and the structure of the organization affected.
Organizational problems include user cooperation in design,
resistance to change, and modifications in the distribution
of power among organizational subunits. The third and final
systems-design problem area is project management. Manage-
ment must coordinate users, the computer staff, and possibly

consultants, and must manage the development of a system.
This management task has proven to be very difficult and
the attainment of the original design goals elusive [Brooks,
1974]. The major attention in improving information systems
has been on the technical problem areas. However, recently
interest has been stimulated in some of the managerial and
behavioral difficulties of developing systems by Kay, 1969,
and Jones and McLean, 19 70.
A. OBJECTIVE
This study focuses on broad management and organizational
relationships, and therefore deliberately avoids, to the maxi-
mum extent possible, the more technical aspects of computers
and computer utilization.
The major thesis is that the reasons information systems
fail are that too much attention has been paid to the techni-
cal aspects of data processing, and that too little atten-
tion has been given to organizational behavior problems in
the design and operation of computer-based information
systems.
This study, accordingly, was motivated not only by an
interest in computer impacts but also by a conviction that
managerial action, especially at the top, strongly influences
the way that computer technology develops and that, in turn,
computer use changes the manager's world in certain predic-
table ways. The changes in the manager's world are changes




The objectives of this thesis are:
1. To demonstrate the types of changes in organizational
structure, job content, communication patterns, and the
nature of control in organizations that result from the
introduction of computer technology into the modern firm.
2. To show that when an organization is considering new
data processing application it must understand and carefully
match the stage of growth for the corporate function involved
with that of the data processing technology it intends to
introduce into the firm.
3. To describe some of the underlying psychological and
social issues that can result in organizational conflict be-
tween the information system's staff and the users of data
processing services.
4. To propose recommendations that will:
a. minimize the adverse behavioral effects that
result from computer technology introduction.
b. resolve some of the intrinsic conflicts that
information systems introduction tend to highlight.
B. SCOPE
The primary focus of this thesis is on the organizational
impact of the computer. The reason for such a focus is
simple: organizations are where computers are located. It
is in these organizations that the initial confrontation
occurs between man and his invention.
A cursory review of the computer industry is presented
along with a description of how the uses of computers have
changed in the last thirty years.
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An estimate of future information systems is described
in terms of distributive systems and the way in which be-
havioral patterns may be modified.
Managers are responsible for organizational effective-
ness— for deciding, for example, whether to use computers
and how to use them. They are also responsible for deciding
what organizational changes are essential when the computer
is adopted, and for accomplishing the necessary changes.
This document explores the backgrounds , attitudes , and per-
ceptions of the two major participants in the computer intro-
duction process, namely, the computer specialist and the
manager.
Special attention is devoted to the basic nature of
organizational information requirements, the time value of
information, the use of information, and the problems of the
resistance that is established by organizational members and
subunits to information sharing.
A detailed set of recommendations is presented that should
allow for the participants in the organizational subunits to




II. COMPUTER INDUSTRY - A USER PERSPECTIVE
The relatively brief history of computers has followed,
for the most part, the cycle of all high technology indus-
tries: a rapid buildup of the technology with the resultant
lag in the ability of the users to see the true implications
of the device or to tap its full potential. This "cultural
lag," as it has been termed, has certainly been true in the
computer industry. Viewing the 50' s as the first decade of
computer usage, the sixties as the second, and the seventies
as the third, certain generalizations can be formulated
regarding the evolutionary development from a user's
standpoint.
A. ERA OF THE ENGINEER
The fifties was the era of the engineer. The need for
the first computers was created by engineers, mathematicians,
and scientists in their demand for raw calculating power.
At first, there was no great interest in the use of computers
for business purposes. Early computers were supported by
government and educational funds; cost effectiveness was not
the primary focus. The first computers were big "number
crunchers," expensive, and difficult to maintain and use.
Since much of the work given to computers had not been done
before, it was hard to determine whether computer benefits
offset costs. Cost justification is particularly difficult
in experimental research and development. The machine
builders received little help from equipment users. Business
13

was not yet aware of the computer's vast potential in business
operations. There were no company planning or special inter-
est groups to give substantive guidance or direction to the
computer manufacturer. Frequently a product was developed
before its market potential had been determined. Thus, the
already developed product sought a suitable market instead
of being determined by market place needs.
B. MARKETING PERIOD
As the first computer decade was the era of the engineer,
the second decade was that of the marketeer. These marketeers
were young, ambitious, enthusiastic, intelligent, and wrapped
up in their new product. As a result, they oversold it on
a grand scale. They failed to realize the practical company
environment in which computers had to operate, and they vastly
overestimated their customer's capability to use the equip-
ment. However, the marketing forces did their job; the six-
ties marked the era of computer proliferation with the number
of installed computers increasing from 4000 to 50,000 systems.
[Kanter, 1973] has described the plight of the user and upper
management in the sixties in these terms:
Computer users have to share the blame for the large
increase in computer installations . Very few understood
the role the computer should play in a company; they
didn't select the areas where it should be used; they
didn't establish priorities or determine schedules; and
future systems planning was almost nil.
Upper management didn't understand the computer's true
nature and didn't take the time to learn, either because
they didn't think they could, or because they thought it
was merely another accounting tool that belonged in the
14

controller's shop. So they turned over the computer to
the technocrats. Thus, systems and programming priest-
hoods ran the show and managed the new machines.
During this decade, the advanced system or innovative
approach was the standard approach. The value of something
became a function of its uniqueness or complexity, not its
worth to the user; the means justified the ends. Vendors
and users alike were subject to a "wish- fulfillment syndrome,"
so that when a new technique or product appeared which bore
some relationship (albeit remote) to a user problem, there
was a tendency to apply it, regardless of its relevance. The
computer and the various concepts of management information
systems, central data bases, operations research, and manage-
ment science were facets of this "wish- fulfillment syndrome"
of the sixties. These activities of the sixties have caused
many of the lingering negative perceptions of data processing
that still exist in the late seventies.
C. ECONOMIC REALITY
The third computer decade began with the business turn-
down of 1970-1971. Companies found themselves under-utilizing
their computers or with excess capacity, because of the over-
sell and overbuy trend of the late sixties at a time when
their business volume was down. For the first time since the
computers appeared on the commercial scene, data processing
managers were forced to cut computer operating budgets.
This economic reality of a downturn has caused a return
to solid business practice and tighter control over computer
and related expenditures. Data processing departments are
15

beginning to be scrutinized as closely as other operating
departments within a company, while the computers themselves
are treated as major capital expenditures which come under
stringent analysis regarding return on investment and cash
flow. There is a more formal planning process by both the
vendor and the customer. This planning cycle emanates more
from user needs and requirements rather than from technology
and product considerations. Users dictate the ""what" of EDP
while vendors supply the "how." The key justification cri-
teria are becoming "ease of use" and "total user benefit"
instead of the degree of sophistication.
16

III. COMPUTER TECHNOLOGICAL GROWTH AND ITS CHARACTERISTICS
A. SYSTEMS ARCHITECTURE
Improvements in performance have typically occurred in a
cyclic fashion where each cycle has become known as a "computer
generation." The 'life cycle' within a computer generation
tends to proceed as follows: a new component technology is
moved from the laboratory to production machines, often with-
in an order-of-magnitude increase in performance over the
previous component technology (generation) . Component char-
acteristics , circuit designs, and manufacturing techniques
continue to be improved and refined to produce further im-
provements in performance, reliability, power consumption,
cost, and other characteristics. Subsequently, the diminish-
ing returns on component improvement focus attention on
innovations in computer architecture and software techniques
which promise greater performance improvements.
Theoretical studies are undertaken to invent system
architectures which, although not practical with the current
generation hardware, provide for large improvement in per-
formance with future generations component technology.
Indeed, it is characteristic of each computer generation
that architectural concepts conceived during earlier genera-
tions, but not economically feasible at that time, became
practical with the new component technology.
Since "Computer Generation" is not a precisely defined
concept, there are some differences in opinion about how
17

many generations there have been to date, and about what the
criterion for a new generation is. In fact, it has been
suggested that there are really two generation scales:
component generations and computer generations; the latter
includes architectural and software-oriented features. Each
computer is thus characterized by a two-component generation
vector.
The following characterizations of component generations
are generally accepted [Joseph, 1972]:
Generation 0. Relays and vacuum tubes. Used to build
one-of-a-kind computers, such as Harvard-IBM computers,
ENIAC. Time period up to 19 53.
Generation 1. Vacuum tubes. Commercial computers, such
as UNIVAC I, IBM 701, IBM 704, IBM 709; 1951-1958.
Generation 2. Transistors. The beginning of solid-state
component technologies. Examples are Philco 2000,
IBM 7090, CDC 6600, and the supercomputers STRETCH
(IBM 7030) and UNIVAC' s LARC ; 19 58-1969.
Generation 3. Solid-state integrated circuits (ICs)
.
An example is the IBM 360 series, Burroughs 6500, and
UNIVAC 110 8; 1967 to date.
Generation 4. Solid-state medium-scale integration (MSI)
and large-scale integration (LSI) . Here entire sub-
systems are manufactured as one monolithic unit.
Examples are the ILLIAC IV computer and the develop-
mental NAVY AADC (All Application Digital Computer)
.
Computer generations have been characterized by [Joseph,
1972] as follows:
Generation 1. Special-purpose computers; introduced in
1951-1952 for scientific or business computations;
single job operation; about 100 simple instructions,
a few index registers; machine language, subroutines,
utility routines, symbolic assemblers.
Generation 2. General-purpose computers; introduced in
1958-1960 for general data processing, about 100
complex instructions, independent and simultaneously
18

operating I/O, high-speed main memory, and a mass
memory; batch processing type of operation; higher-
level languages, software monitors, macro-assemblers,
executives
.
Generation 3. Computer systems, families of computers;
introduced in 1963-1965 for general information pro-
cessing, multiprogrammed and time-shared operation,
remote terminal interactive and job-entry systems;
multiprocessing and real-time teleprocessing systems;
operating systems, many higher-level languages, modular
programs, reentrant subroutines, conversational systems.
Generation 4. Networks of computer systems; introduced
in 1970-1972 for on-line information processing; multi-
processing, new architectures, direct higher-order
language processing; mini- and micro-computers; extend-
ible languages, meta-compilers , subprograms in hard-
ware, microprogrammable computers.
[Joseph, 1972] has also studied the development of computer
generations and the associated improvements in performance
and physical characteristics. He makes the following observa-
tions :
A Each new component generation has come along after
an interval of six years.
A On the average, each new component generation has
resulted in the following changes in computer
characteristics
:
o Speed increased 10 times
o Memory capacity increased 200 times
o Reliability increased 10 times
o Component cost reduced 10 times
o System cost reduced 2.5 times.
B. STAGES OF GROWTH
Although the system architecture analysis discussed in
paragraph A. above provides a clear historical perspective
on the development of the computer hardware industry, it
does not adequately address the growth of the organizational
functions and the interaction and/or impact that the
19

concomitant growth of data processing has made in the
process.
"S" is the shape of growth. The "S" curve can be used
to apply to the origin and growth of anything. It reflects
the outcome of the underlying structural conflicts and
balance from the conception to the maturity of any phenom-
enon. It can be found to represent histories of societies
(as expounded by Spengler to Toynbee) , success patterns of
organizations, market penetration patterns of products, as
well as life cycles of technologies. Though much effort is
expended in describing the conditions that prevail during
various phases of growth, the really worthwhile insights
come from an examination of those elements that would allow
for the explanation of the delicate relationships that drive
the growth process and make it ultimately obsolete.
The spokesmen most articulate about the cyclical growth
patterns in data processing are [Gibson and Nolan, 1974].
Perhaps the best summary of their analysis is that the data
processing budgets for a number of companies, when plotted
over time from initial investment to mature operations, form
an S-shaped curve. Based on this insight, they proceeded to
segment the growth history into four stages, namely, initia-
tion, expansion, formalization, and maturity. For instance,
it appears that many organizations have developed a pattern
for growing computer applications as they move into more
advanced stages of development. Similarly, increased per-
sonnel specialization can be found in organizations as they
20

progress from functional simplicity to more complex forms
of division of labor. Most importantly, a shift in manage-
ment focus, control methodology, and presumably the success-
ful leadership personality type changes as costs escalate
and the role of data processing matures. Figure 1 below is
a synopsis presentation of the work of Gibson and Nolan and
describes the changes in applications, management, and
personnel as data processing matures.
[Withington, 1974] starts with the same objective as
other "stage" theorists. He points out that:
few executives have a clear picture of each of
the generations of computerization and of the ways in
which these succeed each other.
However, if the stage theory is applied,
such an overview permits rational long-range
planning; management can plan for each generation
with a clear idea of the goals it ought to be able
to achieve and how to prepare for the transition
(change) to the next generation.
Withington' s view of the evolutionary process is that it is
essentially technology driven (see Figure 2) and that rapid
reductions in technology costs have the decisive impact on
variables such as: new application functions brought into
the data processing fold; and organizational structure for
managing the data processing environment with the resultant
effect it has on the organizational structure. The major
portion of the current literature supports Withington'
s
reasoning process of treating technology as the dominant
enabling factor that paces the rate at which computers enter
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Gibson and Nolan's Stage IV or Withington's Stage V and are
experiencing the related organizational dilemmas that result
in the transitioning process.
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IV. DRIVING FUNCTIONS CAUSING THE CHANGE
A. INDUSTRY DEMANDS
Although measured in billions of dollars, data processing
is a small part of the total economy. However, the United
States economy is becoming increasingly service oriented in
terms of both employment and contributions to the Gross
National Product. It is estimated that office expenditures
will range between $450 and $475 billion dollars in 1977.
Traditional data processing will account for a mere $30 to
$32 billion of this total. Yet if there is little prospect
for "traditional" data processing, there is a great deal of
room for growth in the "information systems" industry. For
example, each office employee is currently supported by
some $6,000 to $7,000 in capital equipment, whereas each
factory employee is supported by $25,000 to $30,000 in equip-
ment. Opportunities for productivity improvements in the
office and in business communications abound, and a host of
companies are entering this market. In a recent survey con-
ducted by Gnostic Concepts "Fortune's 1000" companies, some
63% of the respondents were found to be favorably disposed
to the trend of distributed information processing, while
only 2 6% were firmly opposed. The results also show that
order entry and fulfillment applications are receiving the
most attention, becoming a focal point for integrating com-
munications with data and text processing. Organizational
25

integration of office, communications, and data processing




A corporation is an organization with a common purpose
in which a number of human beings share and to which they
contribute their personal service or their capital, expect-
ing some return. Organization theorists have come to a more
complex view of the corporation, in which it is seen as a
combination of "systems"— an authority/responsibility system,
a reward/penalty system, a communication system, a social
system, and others. These systems are obviously interrelated
A corporation must determine how the computer can facilitate
the operation of its other "systems" in the overall corporate
purpose. Its management must therefore continuously distin-
guish between what is potential in the computer and what is
actual with respect to its capacity to forward the corpora-
tion's overall purposes. Thus the concept of costs, manage-
able rates of change, and other constraints are part of its
management, just as much as identifying its benefits.
The advent of the computer has focused managerial atten-
tion upon the information system of the corporation. It is
here that the computer has had its most direct and greatest
impact upon corporate organization.
As management as a profession has developed, increasing
weight has been placed on its intellectual aspects—economic
theory, the behavioral sciences, and the natural sciences.
26

Increasing value has been attached to information as an in-
gredient of the management process, and particularly of the
decision making process.
The major driving force, however, behind the corporate
demand for current and future data processing products and
services is the "time value of information" to management.
These "time value" concepts are illustrated below in Figure 3
Business Trends Impact on Information
LessMore Better Faster Costly
Inflation o
Shortages o o o
Government Impact o o
Geographic Expansion o o
Competition o o o
Management Sophistication o o o o
International Markets o o o
Figure 3. Forces Affecting the Value of Information
The data collected and stored within an organization can
be considered to be an inventory of inputs for decision
making and/or status reporting. Like any inventory, these
items lose value with time. In fact, operational data is a
highly perishable quantity relative to its value for decision
making.
The chief executive of Gould, Inc. , in a recent article
in [Business Week, August 23, 1976] describing a real time
interactive management information system, has said that
27

the two most important factors in business are time
and cost. Timely information is che biggest asset a
manager can have. You can't ask other managers for
everything. This way you can do it yourself.
Not all data in this inventory is of the same value. For
example, a possible ranking method for each type of data
might be assigned:
o Class A data - time critical, used for opera-
tional and tactical decision
making.
o Class B data - status information, used for
communicating the state of the
organization.
o Class C data - archival data, stored to meet
contingency or historical report-
ing requirements.
More Class A data is continuously being collected, stored,
and made available for faster decision making. While general
purpose computers worked well for Class B and C data process-
ing needs, the round-trip pipeline to a corporate computer
center for Class A data is too long relative to the time
value of that data. Class A data is of increasing importance
in maintaining control.
Before discussing the current trends in information sys-
tems , it would be helpful to examine the information needs
of lower, middle and top management. Generally, lower man-
agement is concerned with operational information, while
tactical information and strategic information are useful to
middle and top management, respectively. The type of inform-
ation supplied also has to do with activities with which the
information is concerned— the internal environment of the
organization and the external environment in which the firm
28

operates. It is a generally recognized fact that internal
information should be more and more summarized as the level
of management for which it is prepared rises in the hierarch-
ical structure, with top management receiving overall reports
of operations for future planning. On the other hand, lower
echelons of management, being control oriented, receive the
most detailed reports. Between top and lower management is
middle management, which is planning-control oriented. In-
formation concerning the external environment of the organi-
zation should be summarized in exactly the opposite manner
from that of the internal environment. Because the upper
managers are more planning oriented and because planning
necessitates more information about the organization's exter-
nal environment, this type of information should be most
fully supplied to top management. It should be increasingly
summarized and selective as the position of the receiver
decreases in the managerial hierarchy.
Operational information, being at the lowest level, is
concerned with structured and repetitive activities that are
measurable in terms of specific results. It allows line mana-
gers, such as plant foremen and department heads, to measure
performance against predetermined goals, including standards
and budgeted figures. Similarly, operational information
allows lower management to comment on how operating standards
and policies can be improved to assist day-to-day operations.
The feedback of essential information from this low level
keeps higher levels of management aware of unfavorable as
29

well as favorable results. Figure 4 shows the operational
information needed to control the major subsystems of a
typical firm.
Tactical information that covers relatively short time
periods (not greater than twelve months) is used by middle
management to implement the highest level strategic plans
at the functional levels. As with operational information,
tactical information is used by a large number of people.
Examples are a functional budget report that compares actual
to estimated amounts, a production report that evaluates
assembly operations, and a vendor performance report that
evaluates overall vendor performance. Typical tactical in-
formation generated in a firm is shown in Figure 5
.
Strategic information is used primarily by top manage-
ment and its staff to cover a long time span
—
generally one
to five years . This type of information is employed for
planning purposes and for analysis of problem areas to dis-
cover underlying reasons for specific problems or conditions,
In many cases, the objective of strategic information is to
find answers to the question why rather than what or where .
Examples of corporate strategic information are shown in
Figure 6. Planning must occur before strategic information
can be gathered. Strategic planning concerns itself with
establishing objectives and policies that will govern the


































































































Figure 4. Operational information needed to control the
major subsystems of a typical firm.-*-
TSource: Thxerauf, R. , Systems Analysis and Design o f
Real-time Management Information Systems"
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of a typical firm.l
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V. IMPACT ON THE ORGANIZATION
A. THE ORGANIZATION AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY - AN ANALOGY
Information technology has within itself almost all of
the characteristics that are found in organizations. It has
a memory, and, like an individual or an organization, it can
exploit its memory and change and improve it. It has communi-
cation channels that it uses selectively. It has a wide
variety of special problem-solving and information-transforming
routines and rules. It can often be connected to some sort
of machine that performs mechanical manipulative tasks. It
can do all these tasks very rapidly. The only thing it seems
clearly to lack is a sensory apparatus of any consequence.
Whereas people can "read" an enormous variety of signals or
cues coming from the organizational environment, the technol-
ogy can't. It requires a "layer" of people to perform this
reading of information function, and they must translate it
into a standardized form that the computer can handle.
The weaknesses and strengths of the technology as an
organizational substitute provide a hint of its potential
impact on an organization. The incomparable advantage of the
human being at the boundary— at the interface of the organiza-
tion with the physical and cultural world— indicates that
people and activities at this organizational boundary are
relatively less affected than those performing the "internal"
functions of memory maintenance, problem solving, and inform-
ation transmission and transformation. The problem of
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understanding the effects of computers on organizations is,
in large part, one of sorting out traditional human activities
in the organization in the terms just described and estimating
the rate of substitution of technology for man in their
performance.
Information technology at work stores, transmits, and
transforms information, and, in addition, applies it to the
solution of problems. This is exactly what a great number
of people in the modern organization have traditionally done.
If the technology is substituted in part for man because it
has a comparative economic advantage, what is the source of
this advantage?
The advantage seems to lie in the great capacity, the
high speed, and the reliability of the machines as compared
with men. To translate this into organizational effects, one
must understand how organizations have traditionally coped
with the relatively low capacity, low speed, and low reli-
ability of men in performing organizational tasks. The lim-
ited capacity of the individual has been dealt with by the
process of specialization, with one group mastering certain
skills and applying them while other groups have different
responsibilities
.
Specialization also helps solve the problem of speed or,
stated differently, the problem of getting a lot of work
done in a hurry. By breaking the over-all tasks into parts
and allowing people to perform these parts simultaneously,
the length of time necessary to get the organizational job
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done is tremendously shortened. The price paid for this
shortening of time is, of course, the assumption of a problem
of coordination. Man's propensity for error and malperform-
ance gives rise to elaborate and cumbersome systems of control.
Hence, the shape of the modern organization has been derived
—
one in which hierarchical levels of coordination and control
are built in, in an effort to get a wide variety of individuals
in specialized tasks to do what they are supposed to do when
they are supposed to do it.
[Grindley and Humble, 1973] discuss the impact of the
computer on the control aspects of two different industrial
applications
.
One effect of computer data processing has been to
highlight the difference between two forms of control:
human control and mechanized control. We may expect
the computer to influence future organization structure
so that it reflects this distinction. For example, in
each function there may be one manager concerned with
discretionary control and another responsible for its
formal or reflex control systems. The alternative to
this is to give the responsibility for the reflex con-
trol area within each function to the computer depart-
ment. Many companies adopt an uneasy compromise in this
respect:
A bank, having computerized its accounts, nomi-
nally left all the responsibility for their mainten-
ance with the branch managers . The branch managers
were not, in fact, responsible for account accuracy,
for making regular payments as instructed by custo-
mers, or for the provision of statements. While
they became much more effective regarding the dis-
cretionary aspect of their work (selling the bank's
services, etc.) , they lost much of their authority
concerning routine control to the computer center
manager.
Occasionally, however, we find organization structures
which recognize the two separate forms of control but




A chain of retail stores automated part of its
buying procedures. This mechanization of routine
buying allowed buyers to concentrate on getting the
best prices, i.e., on discretionary control.
However, the purchasing manager appointed two
managers under him, a chief buyer responsible for
negotiating contracts and a buying systems manager
responsible for developing the rules covering
routine work.
B. CONFLICT AND ITS EFFECTS
1. The Nature of Conflict
The information systems department (ISD) has the po-
tential for achieving a condition of conflict in the modern
organization, although the following discussion is not in-
tended to imply that any one ISD meets all of the conflict
conditions. These conditions for conflict might include:
o Mutual task dependence
o Asymmetrical work relationships




o Dependence on common resources
o Personal skills and traits
o Communication obstacles
The ISD increasingly controls strategic contingencies for
other departments; other departments depend on the ISD. That
department also depends on the users for input, error correc-
tion, and assistance in designing systems. The relationship
between users and the ISD is asymmetric because the ISD staff
often feels it must understand users' jobs, whereas the
reverse is not always true. Performance criteria and rewards
also differ between the two groups. The ISD is a highly
differentiated specialty; unlike more conventional organization
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structures, small task forces are used to design systems.
There are also many communications obstacles between the
computer specialists and users. Technical jargon can easily
confuse users . Another communication problem occurs during
system design when the computer specialists attempt to learn
user problems. Communication problems may prevent the ISD
staff from understanding how the user works with information
and, what his needs are for a system solution.
In order to provide the reader with a better under-
standing of the underlying behavioral reasons for possible
conflict, the following paragraph presents some fundamental
characteristics of the participants, namely, the computer
specialists (ISD staff) and managers (users)
.
2 . The Participants
A great deal has been written in recent years about
the continuing tensions and antagonisms arising from the
different backgrounds and expectations of managers and compu-
ter specialists. This difference has been described by
[Rose, 1969] (drawing on a distinction originally made by
A. W. Gouldner) in terms of "cosmopolitans," e.g., computer
men who look outside the organization for their career and
their standards of judgement, and managers, "locals," who
usually identify with the single organization in which they
have spent most if not all of their working lives.
A profile of the computer specialist provides us with
insight into some of the potential conditions and states of
mind that could produce conflict. The "average computer
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specialist" is likely to be in his thirties. If he is younger,
he will probably have been in the computer/management science
field since he entered business. In formal education terms
he will usually be better qualified than "Mr. Average Manager."
His biggest satisfaction comes from the challenge of analyzing
and solving problems— and he is extremely conscious of the
potential of the computer, its excitement, its novelty. He
gets strong motivation from his work, but, unless positively
involved in the corporation's problems, may drift into apply-
ing his considerable abilities to purely technical problems.
The best people are scarce, expensive, and mobile—and they
know it. They belong to what has been termed the 'invisible
university' of the computer fraternity. [Weizenbaum, 1976]
has described the innate power of a computer specialist
(programmer)
;
The computer programmer, however, is a creator of
universes for which he alone is the lawgiver. So, of
course, is the designer of any game. But universes of
virtually unlimited complexity can be created in the
form of computer programs. Moreover, and this is a
crucial point, systems so formulated and elaborated act
out their programmed scripts. They compliantly obey
their laws and vividly exhibit their obedient behavior.
No playwright, no stage director, no emperor, however
powerful, has ever exercised such absolute authority to
arrange a stage or a field of battle and to command such
unswervingly dutiful actors or troops.
[Weizenbaum, 1976] also describes two classes of programmers,
the professional and the compulsive, and provides an under-
standing and formula for identifying and coping with these
two phenomena in the remainder of the chapter entitled "Science
and the Compulsive Programmer."
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How may the compulsive programmer be distinguished
from a merely dedicated, hard-working professional pro-
grammer? First, by the fact that the ordinary professional
programmer addresses himself to the problem to be solved,
whereas the compulsive sees the problem mainly as an oppor-
tunity to interact with the computer. The ordinary compu-
ter programmer will usually discuss both his substantive
and his technical programming problem with others. He will
generally do lengthy preparatory work, such as writing
and flow diagramming, before beginning work with the
computer itself. The professional regards programming as
a means toward an end, not as an end in itself. His satis-
faction comes from having solved a substantive problem,
not from having bent a computer to his will.
The compulsive programmer is usually a superb tech-
nician, moreover, one who knows every detail of the com-
puter he works on, its peripheral equipment, the computer's
operating system, etc. He is often tolerated around com-
puter centers because of his knowledge of the system and
because he can write small subsystem programs quickly,
that is, in one or two sessions of, say, twenty hours
each.
Usually the systems he undertakes to build, and on
which he works feverishly, for perhaps a month or two or
three, have very grandiose but extremely imprecisely
stated goals. Some examples of these ambitions are: new
computer languages to facilitate man-machine communica-
tion; a general system that can be taught to play any
board game; a system to make it easier for computer
experts to write super-systems (this last is a favorite)
.
It is characteristic of many such projects that the pro-
grammer can long continue in the conviction that they
demand knowledge about nothing but computers, programming,
etc. And that knowledge he, of course, commands in abun-
dance. Indeed, the point at which such work is often
abandoned is precisely when it ceases to be purely in-
cestuous, i.e., when programming would have to be inter-
rupted in order that knowledge from outside the computer
world may be acquired.
[Weizenbaum, 1976] then provides a glimpse of the power, both
intrinsic and potential, that computers wield:
Science and technology are sustained by their trans-
lations into power and control. To the extent that
computers and computation may be counted as part of
science and technology, they feed at the same table.
The extreme phenomenon of the compulsive programmer
teaches us that computers have the power to sustain
megalomaniac fantasies. But that power of the computer
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is merely an extreme version of a power that is inherent
in all self-validating systems of thought.
The manager, as an arbiter and user of information
services, is the other link in the conflict process. It is
appropriate to briefly discuss the managerial dilemma with
regards to data processing.
The age range of most modern top executives in
government and business— in their early or late fifties— is
a contributing factor to the problem of perceptions and atti-
tudes. They have been trained and attained success in their
careers without experiencing the need or opportunity to be-
come familiar with the intimate working details of modern
information technology. And, confronted by the spectra of
data processing in their own operation and decisions regarding
its acquisition and use, they are often persuaded by glib
salesmen or over enthusiastic technicians (computer special-
ists) to make decisions that are not in their organization's
best interests.
The executive, this manager of management, has gained
respect for his performance as the leader of his organization,
has professional stature in his own field, and is usually
unwilling—at least reluctant— to reveal his ignorance of the
exotic world of data processing. In defense, he may have
totally withdrawn from the scene, trusting that the experts
he hires will work their magic to produce a successful data
processing operation. He may have relegated the computer and
its concomitants to the status of operational backups; like
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the elevator and the air conditioner, they will function and
serve the organization because people are charged with making
them run.
The "Average Manager" has been described by [Mant,
1971] in the following way:
He tends to be in his late forties
—
past the first
blush of ambition but not yet on the run home. He does
not attract memorable labels ("crown prince," etc.) be-
cause his visibility within and without the company is
low. ... He is responsible and willing and has probably
made a rational accommodation to limited prospects in
the company. He provides the continuity and stability
in the infrastructure of the organization, leaving the
most spectacular performance and promotion to the others.
He is basically conservative but still capable of change.
... Unless he is in line for immediate promotion, he
is likely to use new ideas and techniques only so far as
he can immediately apply them.
It should be noted, however, that conflict between these
groups of diverse people is not necessarily harmful. In con-
ditions of uncertainty, when new information systems are
being presented for consideration or testing, conflict may
be a way of selection between the views of the innovators
and those of the more conservative managers. Conflict in
times of change may be beneficial but has to be kept within
reasonable limits. [Stewart, 1971] suggests in her study of
a large group of users that one of the strengths of the
British Petroleum Company (BP) was the tolerance that contin-




C. POWER AND POLITICS
1. Subunit Analysis
Recently a theory of organizational power has been
developed which focuses on subunits of the organization as
the unit of analysis rather than on individuals [Hickson
and others, 1971]. The model relates the amount of power
held by a subunit to four variables: uncertainty, substitut-
ability, work flow centrality and immediacy, and the control
of strategic contingencies. According to the model, the
more a subunit copes with uncertainty, the more power it will
have. For routine information systems the user depends on
the operations group of the information services department
(ISD) to produce output accurately and on schedule. The out-
put of the ISD controls some of the uncertainty the user
experiences in his work. The department also produces in-
formation which can be used to reduce a decisionmaker's
uncertainty. During systems design, the ISD designs a new
system which assumes some of the functions the user controlled
in the past. Here, the ISD has created uncertainty for the
user which only the ISD can resolve.
The power model also indicates that, the greater the
indispensability of a subunit, the greater is its power.
There are few alternatives to the ISD, particularly if the
department already exists and the organization has its own
equipment.
The power model also hypothesizes that, the greater
the pervasiveness and the immediacy of the work flows, the
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greater is the power of the subunit. If work flows are
highly independent among subunits, then a key department
will be powerful. Immediacy of work flows refers to the
speed with which a problem in one department affects others.
Depending on the nature of the application, the ISD may
have high work flow pervasiveness and immediacy. For
example, interruption of on-line service in a reservation
system can drastically affect the functioning of other
departments in the organization.
The final variable in the power model is the control
of contingencies; the more control of other subunits ' stra-
tegic contingencies by a subunit, the greater is its power.
Control over strategic contingencies relates to the inter-
dependence between subunits; if A controls many of B's con-
tingencies, than B is dependent on A. One of the unique
aspects of the ISD is its relationship with a number of dif-
ferent areas and subunits within the organization. For both
the operation and the design of information systems, the ISD
controls many contingencies for other subunits.
The ISD contains an inherently high level of rele-
vance on all of the power model variables, though the con-
centration of power in this subunit is often unrecognized.
When information systems are implemented, there has been a
tendency to focus on each individual application and not see
the entire impact of all systems on the organization. The
information services staff and users have ignored the gra-
dual transfer of power to the ISD and the problems this may
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create. Users have become more powerless and more frustrated
without understanding the reasons or even recognizing that
the problem exists.
[Lucas, 19 75] provides an image of the attitudes of
users toward the ISD as a result of his study on the power
perception of the users:
The frustration and uneasiness are reflected in
unfavorable attitudes toward information systems and
the information systems staff. Unfavorable attitudes
influence user cooperation with and use of information
systems
.
2 . Resistance to Information Sharing
Information-sharing includes sharing organizational
information about: data, data sources, and data collection
methods; program instructions for processing, combining,
disaggregating, and summarizing the data; interpretations of
the data and the theories or assumptions upon which inter-
pretations are made; and decisions about who has access to
any of the above, including who is obligated to use what
data, programs, or interpretive concepts as a basis for organ-
izational action.
Today a person's or a subunit's power in an organiza-
tion is often a function of the capability to preempt inform-
ation. By controlling access to information, persons or
subunits can protect themselves somewhat from invasions of
authority because others lack the information they would need
or could use to dislodge them. They can define their situa-
tions much more as they choose to because they have informa-
tion about it that others lack. Indeed, others may also judge
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their significance through their image of reality because
others have less information about the environment—except
possibly the people who comprise it. They can bargain with
information for power and status and for other information
they need to improve their control capability and status.
[Downs, 19 67] suggests some of the current problems of
organizational politics for information-sharing systems such
as urban data banks and management information systems (MIS)
:
Within city governments, those who actually control
automatic data systems gain in power at the expense of
those who do not. Most city officials are acutely aware
of this potential power shift. Each operating depart-
ment naturally wants to retain as much power as possible
over its own behavior and its traditional sphere of
activity. Its members are especially anxious to prevent
"outsiders" from having detailed knowledge about every
aspect of the department's operations. Hence, nearly
every department with operations susceptible to compu-
terized management will at least initially fight for its
own computer and data system controlled by its own
members
.
[Argyris, 1970] discusses the operational politics that a
Management Information System (MIS) can engender:
The manager's reactions to threats and arrogance
(from MIS-connected personnel) can be predicted. His
feelings of mistrust, suspicion, and fears of inadequacy
find ways to influence other managers to let the MIS
group atrophy or be disbanded. For example, not enough
company departments will be persuaded to pay for the
MIS services. Or management will find that people don't
understand the value of the new systems.
3 . Structural Aspects
The organization's structural sources that encourage
resistance to information-sharing have been very well described





The issue of hierarchy is discussed by [Wilensky,
1967] in the following terras
;
Information is a resource that symbolizes status,
enhances authority, and shapes careers. In reporting
at every level, hierarchy is conducive to concealment
and misrepresentation. Subordinates are asked to
transmit information that can be used to evaluate their
performance. Their motive for "making it look good,"
for "playing it safe," is obvious. A study [Read, 1959]
of 52 middle managers (mean age 37) found a high cor-
relation between upward work-life mobility and holding
back "problem" information about such issues as lack
of authority to meet responsibilities, fights with
other units, unforeseen costs, rapid changes in produc-
tion scheduling or work flow, fruitless progress reports,
constant interruptions, insufficient time or budget to
train subordinates, insufficient equipment or supplies,
and so on. Restriction of such problem information is
motivated by the desire not only to please but also to
preserve comfortable routines of work: if the sub-
ordinate alerts the boss to pending trouble, the former
is apt to find himself on a committee to solve the prob-
lem. Hierarchy blocks communication, blockages lead to




Specialization is a source of resistance from
those individuals who are rewarded by the organization for
the norms that are designed around particular functions or
competences. There are two major aspects of this subject
area that are explored by both Wilensky and Argyris, namely
power maintenance and risk taking. The first aspect, the
maintenance of power, is discussed by [Wilensky, 1967]:
As a source of information blockage and distortion,
specialization may be more powerful than hierarchy.
Each service, each division, indeed every subunit,
becomes a guardian of its own mission, standards, and
skills; lines of organization become lines of loyalty
and secrecy Top men are reluctant to let their
subordinates "take on" rivals by asking for information
for fear that their unit will betray weakness, invite
counter- inquiries , or incur debt. While information
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can also be used to persuade potential allies and to
facilitate accommodation with rivals it is more
commonly hoarded for selective use in less collabora-
tive struggles for power and position.
A second source of resistance from specialized
subunits will be their reluctance to risk present operation
styles and rewards in order to use the new and untested
information technology. The underlying reasons for this
risk-adverse position of top executives is explored by
[Argyris, 1970]:
There is a deeper reason for executive resistance.
It's rarely discussed because executives themselves
are rarely aware of it. This basic, unspoken reason
usually surfaces after lengthy discussion about the
probable long-range effects of MIS. At this point,
managers slowly begin to realize that fundamental
change will be required in their personal styles of
managerial thought and behavior. That's when the
danger signals start. Those other stated objections
—
lack of knowledge and the primitive state of the art
are important, but only temporary. Eventually they
will be overcome by research and dissemination of
knowledge. But concern and fear about what MIS will
do to managers is what creates the basic resistance.
c. Centralization
The third structural contributor to resistance
to information sharing is centralization and the relevant
dilemma of information control is discussed by [Wilensky,
1967]
:
Related to the information pathologies of hierarchy
and specialization is the dilemma of centralization:
if intelligence is lodged at the top, too few officials
and experts with too little accurate and relevant inform-
ation are too far out of touch and too over- loaded to
function effectively; on the other hand, if intelligence
is scattered throughout the organization, many subordi-
nate units , too many officials and experts with too
much specialized information may engage in dysfunctional
competition, may delay decisions while they warily con-
sult each other, and may distort information as they
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pass it up. More simply, plans are manageable only if
we delegate, plans are coordinated in relation to
organizational goals only if we centralize.
[Argyris, 1970] describes the effects of centralization on
the perceptions of management:
As the informal modes become explicit, information
comes increasingly under the control of top management.
The top level starts to see things it never saw before.
Middle managers feel increasingly hemmed in. In
psychological language, they will experience a great
restriction of their space of free movement, resulting
in feelings of lack of choice, pressure, psychological
failure. These feelings in turn can lead to increasing
feelings of helplessness and decreasing feelings of
responsibility. Result: a tendency to withdraw or to
become dependent upon those who created or approved the
restriction of space of free movement. Sound familiar?
MIS can do to middle and near-top management exactly





VI. TECHNOLOGY CHANGES AND ORGANIZATIONAL IMPLICATIONS
Many forecasts are available on the future of organiza-
tions and management. The hazards of forecasting technology
impacts on organizations are represented in the often quoted
predictions made by [Leavitt and Whisler, 1958] . Because of
the new technology epitomized by the high speed computer
and the emergence of operations research methods, the authors
projected a drastic change in the roles and functions of
middle and upper management. Middle management tasks would
become more structured, because a greater portion of the work
at that level would be programmed. The line between middle
and upper management would become more distinct as certain
middle-management jobs moved downward in the hierarchy, and
former middle-management tasks relating to planning, innova-
tion, and creativity would rise to become essentially the
exclusive domain of top management. In effect, they were
projecting a move toward recentralization in organizations.
Even though electronic data processing has influenced
organization structure and the tasks of managers, it has not
resulted in the withering away of middle-management positions
and a major return to centralization [Stewart, 1971]. On
the contrary, within ten years [Bennis, 1966] was predicting
that
Adaptive, temporary systems of diverse specialists.
.... linked together by coordinating and task-evaluative
specialists in organic flux will gradually replace
bureaucracy as we know it.
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More specifically, in 1973 another noted analyst made the
following projection [Mee, 1973]:
The manager of the future will deal with highly
complex organizations. The organizational vehicle
will not be the hierarchical pyramid in which decisions
are centralized and most of the planning is done at
the top.
Data processing power is currently available in equipment
in addition to minicomputer systems, terminals, or other
products normally under the jurisdictional control of data
processing management. This equipment includes:
o text processors
o personal computers (IBM 5100, WANG 1100, etc.)
o digital numerical control processors
o electronic PBX
o processor based replicating and duplicating
equipment (such as the XEROX 9 200)
o digital facsimile transmitter
o facilities monitoring systems
All of this equipment— again generally not under the
control of data processing management—has substantial spare
processing capability which could conceivably be tapped to
satisfy information needs in a more timely fashion.
New products will provide for the evolution of a hierarchy
of information handling vehicles, which are optimized to
specific tasks and have capabilities of processing and storing
data at many levels. There is a growing and dominant reali-
zation in the literature on this topic that a computer-
oriented application is not a monolithic task, but many tightly
or loosely coupled interrelating functions. [Pullen and
Simko, 19 77] have recently presented their views on the impact





Distributive processing is moving computer power
and data storage capabilities physically closer to
the ultimate user, at the task level. Examples are
found in POS (Point of Sale) , factory data collection,
text processing, inventory control, order entry,
production line scheduling, process control, data
entry, and general purpose transaction processing.
As critical parts are stored closer to the production
lines, so will critical data be stored closer to the
decision-making points. In essence, it is data distri-
bution that is creating the demand for the distribution
of data processing power such that the time value of
information can be maximized.
[Pullen and Simko, 1977] also cite two effects on companies
that will occur as a result of distributive processing:
Distribution of data processing capabilities will
have two basic impacts on a company. First, there will
be staff reductions in clerical and support personnel
as a result of transaction automation (users will
directly interact with the system) ; second, there will
be an increase in requirements for data processing
professionals. Direct data entry, per se, will be the
responsibility of the operating units. Transaction
processing loops will be significantly shortened by
the use of micro processors and low cost/volume storage
capabilities at the point of data entry.
[Kanter, 1973] describes the emerging role of the information
systems executive and the alternative course of action"
Tomorrow's EDP manager will find himself with a
widened sphere of responsibility and a more strategic
location within his company's organization. More and
more companies are placing their total information
processing requirement under a top computer executive
(TCE) who reports to a senior vice president or
directly to the president, and, in many instances,
himself is a vice president.
Only those companies which continue to operate
with the EDP perspective of the fifties and sixties
will place the EDP functions under the direction of the
accounting department. The more enlightened companies,
which view information and its processing as an asset,
as a source of power equal to, or greater than, the
traditional three m's—men, machines, and money—will
adopt the TCE concept.

As a socializing force, the new computer technology can
help managers to think and act with better understanding
of the framework of the corporate organization, not just
their own department. The department syndrome, the consider-
ation and promotion of limited departmental objectives which
may vary from corporate interests, is a serious problem in
corporate performance today because of overall corporate
size and complexity. Educational and value differences and
conflicts among specialists within departments aggravate
this problem. [Fahey, 1969] provides an example of the use
of the computer as a device to resolve these departmental
conflicts
:
The scientist or engineer engaged in product develop-
ment often has difficulty communicating with sales or
marketing personnel and seeing their needs. The funda-
mental need for each to understand the other and for
both to understand the broader corporation is so great
that it is almost constructive to increase their under-
standing of the economic and technical realities facing
both departments. Mutual confrontation of the whole
cycle of product development according to revenue, cost,
and time "models" reflecting the state and direction of
the corporation's broader activities can provide a basis
for more meaningful communication among managers of
complementary departments engaged in the same corporate
process, be it production or new product development and
introduction. Computer models can help to refine cor-
porate goals and strategies, and, in turn, corporate
objectives, divisional and departmental tasks and
standards, placing them in a context which is entirely
practical for day-to-day decision making.
A fourth generation of hardware and software to support
data base-oriented processing is currently in its adolescence
[Stein, 1977], and by the late 1970's all major computer
manufacturers will be delivering mature fourth-generation
products. The dominant configuration will use inexpensive
53

satellite computers to perform local functions and to com-
municate with the central system where the data base resides.
The central system will employ highly cost-effective disk
storage, mature data-base management software, and software/
hardware techniques that enable a machine to adjust itself
for optimum performance of different kinds of work running
concurrently— a method referred to as virtual machine tech-
niques [Turn, 1974],
The experience of pioneering fourth-generation users such
as Weyerhauser, Zayre, and the Department of Defense indicates
that this generation will cause substantial redistributions
of management functions in the organization [Withington,
1974]. Most notably, procurement, transportation, personnel
administration, cash management, and other logistic functions
will be moved from the field to headquarters to achieve econ-
omies of scale available from applying specialist skills to
the pooled needs of the entire organization. These logistic
functions had formerly been decentralized only because it
was impractical to bring all the detailed data together;
field managers have never welcomed these administrative
responsibilities and may well be glad to be relieved of them.
Tactical decision making, by contrast, is moving from
headquarters out to the field. In the past, imperfect data
required that time-pressured decisions be made intuitively
using the most trustworthy experience available, and this
experience has usually been found at headquarters. Now the
information specialists can provide anyone, anywhere with all
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the relevant data and records, plus supporting services such
as exact pricing calculations. This trend is slowly reducing
managerial reliance on subjective judgement based on experi-
ence and is increasing managerial reliance on on-the-spot
knowledge of the situation; as a consequence, the field mana-
ger's authority is gradually being increased.
[Withington, 1974] describes a situation in the banking
industry that illustrates the impact of distributed processing
on the central office managers as a result of increased auth-
ority given to the branch manager:
In one bank, the size of the maximum loan a bank
manager is authorized to approve has been quadrupled
because he has direct access to a central computer-
based customer credit file. As a result of the decreased
number of forwarded loan applications, the number of loan
officers at the central office has been cut in half.
[Pullen and Simko, 19 77] have presented an image of the cor-
porate information systems scheme for the 19 80's. The authors
suggest that:
An emerging information management configuration
will be complex and highly integrated with all corporate
functions. To deal with this environment, companies
will need to develop some very different concepts and
skills. Data processing management will be joined, or
eclipsed by: a corporate communications architect/
administrator, an information inventory/resource manager,
and a corporate teleprocessing/communications manager.
If the potential benefits of data processing are to be
realized, the most important changes required over the next
decade will be those of management's approach to data pro-
cessing. As enterprises begin to understand the value of
their corporate data as assets, many questions will arise
regarding custody of, and access to, these assets. It is
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doubtful that questions regarding access to data can be
resolved by the data processing departments alone; other
elements of management associated with the data itself will
be involved. For data processing to provide benefits to
end users, it needs to be viewed as an integral part of the
enterprise, receiving direct management support from other
organizational entities, and responding to changes in the




It should be clear from the material presented, that it
is virtually impossible to develop and utilize information
systems in isolation, since many groups in the organization
are involved. Even for systems supporting a single decision-
maker, computer personnel from a subunit other than the
user's, must work with him. Thus, new interpersonal rela-
tionships are established as information systems are devel-
oped. For some of the new applications a number of functional
areas in the organization will use a single system, requiring
more coordination among these areas. Such systems introduce
new dependencies among the subunits and between the informa-
tion services department and the subunits. A major new
department (ISD) which is responsible for information systems
has developed, and the increasing power of this new subunit
has an impact on the structure of the organization. New
dependencies and power relationships among departments as a
result of the development of an information system can create
major organizational behavior problems.
A data processing installation used to be operationally
defined as a room full of computers and key punches surrounded
by mid and end users. The advent of third generation systems
(Withington 1 s Stage III) added large numbers of system support
people. In the future, some of these rooms full of computers
(as well as a sizable fraction of both the key punches and
the support staff) can and will be replaced by remote job
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entry stations and by end user terminals. Alternatively,
such "computerless" work stations may be placed with groups
that have never before had any kind of computer installation.
Such computerless installations might well be controlled
organizationally by their users rather than by the data pro-
cessing centers. This, in turn, might have a significant
impact on the management style and career-path potential of
those concerned with the operation and use of such installa-
tions. While the data processing industry has learned a
little about how to evaluate the operations function of a
"classical" data processing center, it has tended to ignore,
in this process, the end users and applications developers
surrounding such a center. Work is needed now to establish
management criteria and procedures for appraising the compu-
terless installation and for obtaining an overall evaluation
of an installation that happens to also contain "classical"
data processing operations.
The method discussed in Section III.B. defining the stages
of growth of any organization requires that one should con-
sider the organization's total information expenses, inclu-
ding clerical and administrative labor, as the base against
which progress should be measured. The big divide is then
that portion of the total information processing expense that
is subject to systematized control, measurement, and manage-
ment. For typical organizations there exists a coexistence
of several technologies and of several investment opportuni-
ties simultaneously at various stages of development, where

data processing may be at Stage IV, telecommunications at
Stage II, word processing at Stage II, and general adminis-
trative systems just beginning to emerge. Opportunities
for improved cost/benefit performance exist in these new
application areas because of their latent potential origin-
ating from the fact that they have been largely neglected in
the past 10 to 20 years when most energies were diverted to
the glamour of data processing. As increased understanding
takes place concerning these opportunities, project develop-
ment resources will be shifted where the potential return
to the organization is maximized. As was discussed in
Section IV. B., not all data in the corporate inventory is
of the same value. This fact is forcing data processing
management to accept distributed processing systems, and
will require executive management to invest heavily in even
more sophisticated information systems.
The changes in the organization will put some new demands
on data processing professionals. Data processing manage-
ment desires control of data processing and communication
facilities relative to their selection, operation, integra-
tion, and prioritization. Executive management desires con-
trol of data flow relative to enforcement of corporate poli-
cies, measurement of corporate and management performance,
and maximizing corporate benefits while minimizing costs.
These are not necessarily conflicting nor irreconcilable
benefits, but they will require serious redirection of
managers 1 training and attitudes. The latter will require

a different set of management skills (less technical and
supervisory, more conceptual and coordinated) to optimize
the information processing function in the firm. The pro-
file of data processing professionals will be changing to
stress the following:
o user training/orientation skills
o systems analysis experience and capabilities
o industrial engineering background or training
o minicomputer programming experience
o telecommunications networking experience.
The changing role relationships between the data processing
professional and the users of data processing services in
the future use of distributive computing networks will
result in the data processing professionals spending more
time in the field at user sites. With the blending of in-
formation functions into the basic fabric of the business
operation, the essential job requirements of the data pro-
cessing professional will require an awareness and apprecia-
tion of management's overall information needs and a practi-
cal systems perspective built on the business facts of life.
The data processing manager who builds his career solely on
his technical expertise, if he is lucky, finds himself in a
technical staff capacity while someone far less technical,
but a lot more in tune with business operations, runs the
show.
The trends in data processing applications indicate that,
in all segments of the corporate area where data processing
applications originate today, such applications will grow
into large, integrated sets of applications systems oriented
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toward on-line transaction processing, with heavy data-base
and data communications requirements. At the same time,
the accelerating proliferation of stand-alone minicomputer-
based systems will continue, with such systems serving as
"intelligent" terminals in hierarchical computer networks
and as increasingly practical and appealing devices for
implementing "isolated" applications requiring only locally
available data. The rate at which communications-based data
processing will grow (including networks of computers) is
dependent upon the bigger issue of the distribution of data
processing power (centralized versus decentralized data
processing) . This last issue presents some very complex
problems with managerial, administrative, and "political"
overtones, and, in addition, has a number of genuinely tech-
nological problems associated with it. The growth of data-
base applications will push toward centralization until and
unless the problems of distributed data bases and computer
networks are solved in a commercially viable fashion. There-
fore, data processing management, and indeed, general manage-
ment, faces a severe test. Present management techniques
cannot cope either with the increasingly complex technologi-
cal environment, nor with the growing user dependence on




Section V presented a brief discussion of some of the
behavioral reasons that are behind the lack of success of
some information systems. First, many parties, including
management, users, and the information services department
staff (data processing professionals) are involved in the
design and operation of information systems. All of these
groups must work together to develop and operate successful
systems. Second, a number of variables are involved in the
design and operation of successful systems. The complex
relationships among technical, behavioral, situational, and
personal factors all must be considered. If any variable is
ignored, systems are likely to fail. The goal of this sec-
tion is to provide some ideas for consideration in order to
develop successful information systems which have a high
level of use and make a positive contribution to decision-
makers and the organization.
A. OPERATIONS
The operation of existing information systems is an
important activity. The information services department
(ISD) provides a service, and users form attitudes from their
contact with operations; it should be easy and enjoyable for
the user to use the systems. The following guidelines for
operations based primarily on the importance of service
quality are presented:

1. Develop user representatives for applications to
interface the user with the ISD. For any given
system, no matter what the problem, the user should
be able to contact a single representative of the
ISD who is responsible for seeing that the prob-
lem is solved.
2. Plan for changes to existing systems as users gain
experience with them, and allocate a portion of the
budget for changes. Try to originate changes; for
example, monitor users' reactions to determine what
modifications are needed.
3. Consider the use of a steering committee to set
priorities for the operation of systems.
4. Provide sufficient computer capacity to meet, special
requests and peak processing loads. The ability
to respond quickly to special jobs is one highly
visible sign of responsiveness and high quality
service.
5. Be certain that existing systems are operating at
a satisfactory level of performance as evaluated




Systems design is crucial to the organization and to the
development of successful information systems. The control
and processing of information is vitally important to the
organization's success and survival. The systems design
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process is a creative activity which involves a number of
individuals from different areas in the organization.
Several important design considerations are presented below
with the intent of coping with some of the behavioral issues
raised in Sections IV, V, and VI.
1. Let the user design the system if possible. The
information services staff should act as a catalyst
and map the user's functional and logical design
into manual procedures and computer programs.
2. Consider the use of a steering committee of users
and the ISD staff to allocate resources and make
decisions on proposed applications.
3. Consider and diagnose the multiple roles of inform-
ation for different decisionmakers and decision-
making situations. For example, a distinction has
been made in Section IV. B. between tactical and
status information. Exception reporting might be
appropriate for tactical problems. For status
information, users might respond favorably if able
to obtain data as needed, possibly through batch
retrieval packages or an on-line inquiry facility.
4. Consider different personal and situational factors
and decision styles in developing systems. Provide
enough flexibility that users in different environ-
ments and with different levels of experience,
education, etc., can benefit from the system.

5. Develop a good user interface; for example,
consider the use of on-line systems to reduce
the burden of input and output on users. Make
it easy mechanically to use the system.
6. Include training in the design of the system,
possibly by having the user design team train
others so that high levels of use of a system
will be possible.
C. ORGANIZATIONAL
The guidelines and recommendations above have been sug-
gested to improve the operation and design of information
systems. However, these steps are not sufficient to prevent
information systems from becoming failures. The spirit of
the recommendations is of major importance; a set of atti-
tudes and an approach to information system activities
which consciously considers the context of the organization
underlie the recommendations. The three major groups in the
organization concerned with information systems (management,
users, and the information services department staff) must
adopt this perspective and cooperate to see that the recom-
mendations like those above are followed.
Management has the responsibility to set goals and prior-
ities for the ISD and users. What types of systems should
be stressed, and are the systems under development consistent
with the overall goals and objectives of the organization?
Management also has the responsibility to influence users
and the ISD by participating in decisions about information
65

systems, including decisions on the selection of new applica-
tions and on systems design issues. Finally, management
influences users and the ISD. Users should be rewarded for
their cooperation and participation in design. The ISD staff
should be rewarded for the design of successful, user-
oriented systems, not just for implementing a system.
Users have the responsibility to learn about information
systems, contribute to their operation and development, and
participate in making intelligent decisions about them.
Users need to participate in systems design and, wherever
possible, should design systems themselves. User input is
necessary in order to develop a high quality system; parti-
cipation in design makes implementation easier and stimulates
greater use of the system. To encourage use of systems,
users could form groups for different systems; the groups
meeting and trading ideas on how best to use the output of
the system.
The information systems department has much of the respon-
sibility for designing and operating successful information
systems. The recommendations made in the two paragraphs of
this section are basically aimed at the ISD. The emphasis
on the development of systems must be on the quality of
service as perceived by the users. The individual differ-
ences among users in situational, personal, and decision
style variables should be understood and accepted by the
staff. The various roles of information and the importance
of favorable user attitudes should also be stressed. For
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the ISD the basis of the recommended approach is a philosophy
of user-oriented design and operations. Quality rather than
quantity is emphasized. If this approach is followed, sys-
tems will probably take longer to develop and will cost more.
However, if the analysis is correct, such information sys-
tems should be more heavily used and should make a greater
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